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INTRODUCTION
Thank you, Dean Levi, for the invitation to deliver this year’s
Brainerd Currie lecture. Professor Currie, a professor at Duke Law
School near the beginning and then again at the end of his career, was
an intellectual giant. He transformed the field of conflict of laws and
made closely related contributions to other areas of the law, including
subject matter jurisdiction, forum choice, and admiralty. I am
honored to give a lecture that bears his name. Because my lecture
touches on some of the themes of his work, I like to think that he
would have found it of some interest.
Samuel Adams, the Massachusetts patriot, was not enthusiastic
about the newly proposed Constitution. He particularly did not like
its introductory phrase, “We the People of the United States.” The
phrase signaled a departure from the Articles of Confederation that
Copyright © 2010 by William A. Fletcher.
† Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Richard W. Jennings, Jr.,
Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. I thank
Professors Akhil Amar and James Pfander for their generous and insightful comments as I
prepared this lecture for publication. I also thank my law clerks, Andrew Dawson, Helen
Gilbert, Michael Gilbert, and Benjamin Kingsley, for their research and editing assistance. The
published lecture that appears here is a somewhat expanded version of the lecture delivered
orally.
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the Constitution was to replace. The constituting authorities for the
Articles of Confederation were the states, which had signed the
Articles as states in the same way that sovereign countries would sign
a treaty. By contrast, the constituting authority for the Constitution
was the people. Adams wrote to his friend Richard Henry Lee of
Virginia on December 3, 1787, “[A]s I enter the Building I stumble at
the Threshold. I meet with a National Government, instead of a
1
Federal Union of Sovereign States.”
I stumble at a smaller but nonetheless important threshold, this
one in Article III of the Constitution. The threshold is the word “all,”
which appears five times in the first two paragraphs of Section 2. The
word, and its meaning, raise the same question the phrase “we the
people” raised for Adams. The question was then, and it remains
today, the division of authority between—to use Adams’s words—the
national government and the sovereign states.
Article III is the judicial article of the Constitution,
corresponding to Articles I and II, the legislative and executive
articles. Article I, Section 8 is closely analogous to Article III, Section
2. Unlike state legislatures, Congress is not a legislative body with
2
Before the post–Civil War
general legislative authority.
amendments, Congress was limited to the heads of legislative power
that appear in Article I, Section 8—such as the commerce power, the
spending power, and the bankruptcy power. If Congress cannot tie
federal legislation to a specified head of power, that legislation is
unconstitutional.
Similarly, unlike state courts, federal courts are not courts of
general jurisdiction. Rather, federal courts are limited to the heads of
subject matter jurisdiction specified in Article III, Section 2, just as
Congress was originally limited to the heads of legislative power
specified in Article I, Section 8. If a case does not fall under one of
the specified heads of jurisdiction in Article III, Section 2, a federal
court cannot hear it.
The first paragraph of Article III, Section 2 sets forth the heads
of jurisdiction for the federal courts generally, including but not
limited to the Supreme Court. The first paragraph of Section 2 begins
with three heads of jurisdiction, each of which is preceded by the
word “all”:
1. Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 1787), in 4 THE WRITINGS
(Henry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1908).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress only power “herein granted”).

OF SAMUEL ADAMS 324
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The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
3
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .

I will call these federal question, ambassador, and admiralty
jurisdiction. The first paragraph then continues with the remaining
heads of jurisdiction, none of which is preceded by “all”:
The judicial Power shall extend . . . —to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;—to controversies between two or
more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—
between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
4
Subjects.

Do not be bothered by the change from “cases” to “controversies.”
By “cases,” the Framers almost certainly meant either criminal or
5
civil cases; by “controversies,” they meant only civil cases. That
change will not be central to our discussion.
The second paragraph of Section 2 more specifically sets forth
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It provides that the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction in two categories of cases
preceded by the word “all”—ambassador cases and cases in which a
state is a party. In other categories of cases, the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction is appellate. The second paragraph provides:
3. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431–32 (1793) (Iredell, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “controversies” was never intended to include criminal proceedings);
1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. note E, at 420–21 (Phila.,
William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (noting that the word “controversies” was
understood to mean civil cases); JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 536 n.2 (Boston, Hilliart Gray & Co. 1833); Peter S. Du Ponceau, Provost,
Law Acad. of Phila., A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Courts
of the United States, Valedictory Address to the Students of the Law Academy of Philadelphia
(Apr. 22, 1824), in A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila., Abraham Small 1824). For discussion, see
William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of
Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 266–67 (1990), and James E. Pfander, Rethinking the
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 605–10 (1994),
both arguing that “controversies” meant only civil cases. But see Robert J. Pushaw, Article III’s
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447, 460–64 (1994) (disputing this interpretation of “cases” and “controversies”).
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In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
6
Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The word “all” thus appears as a lead-in to the first three heads
of jurisdiction of the first paragraph dealing generally with subject
matter jurisdiction in the federal courts—federal question,
ambassador, and admiralty jurisdiction. Then it appears again as the
lead-in to the two heads of original jurisdiction in the second
paragraph dealing specifically with the subject matter jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court—ambassador and state-as-a-party jurisdiction.
Finally, it appears as the lead-in to the residuary clause in the second
paragraph. The question I will address in this lecture is the meaning
of the word “all” the first four times it appears in these two
paragraphs.
Despite its textual prominence at the beginning of Section 2, the
word has received relatively little attention, either in the Framers’
time or in our own. Far from stumbling at the threshold, most
people—including the Framers and most modern academics—have
stepped over the word without comment. There have been a few
notable exceptions, however. For example, as I will discuss in a
moment, Justice Story, writing for the Supreme Court in Martin v.
7
Hunter’s Lessee in 1816, relied on the word in explaining his broad
view of the constitutionally obligatory jurisdiction of the federal
8
courts. Professor William Crosskey, in his two-volume study of the
Constitution in 1953, had a similarly expansive view of federal court
9
jurisdiction. Finally, Professor Akhil Amar has paid close and
sustained attention to the word, beginning with his groundbreaking
10
article in 1985.

6.
7.
8.
9.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
Id. at 334.
1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 614–15 (1953).
10. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Neo-Federalist]; see also
Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989) [hereinafter Amar, Original Jurisdiction]; Akhil Reed Amar, The
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Building on but not entirely agreeing with Justice Story,
Professor Amar argues that the word “all” means that Congress is
constitutionally required to confer on the federal courts all of the
jurisdiction authorized under the first three heads of jurisdiction of
the first paragraph of Section 2—that is, federal question,
ambassador, and admiralty. In Professor Amar’s view, however, this
reading of the word “all” does not apply to the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction in state-as-a-party cases in the second paragraph
of Section 2. Therefore, according to Professor Amar, Congress is not
constitutionally required to confer on the Supreme Court original
11
jurisdiction over all state-as-a-party cases.
For the three heads of jurisdiction in the first paragraph of
Section 2, to which he argues that his reading of the word “all” does
apply, Professor Amar argues that the full extent of the
constitutionally available jurisdiction must be conferred on some
12
federal court. In his view, it does not matter whether the jurisdiction
can be exercised as an original matter by a federal trial court, or on
appeal by the United States Supreme Court, provided that at some
point in the life of the case a federal court can exercise jurisdiction.
Nor, in Professor Amar’s view, does it matter in these three
categories of cases whether federal jurisdiction is concurrent with or
13
exclusive of the jurisdiction of the state courts. Thus, a case falling
under one of the first three heads of jurisdiction might never actually
come into a federal court. For example, the parties may choose to
litigate a federal question case in state rather than federal court, and
the losing party in state court may choose not to seek review in the
14
United States Supreme Court.
I agree that the word “all” is important, but I disagree with
Professor Amar as to its meaning. As I read the historical evidence,
the word “all” applies to, and has the same meaning for, all four
heads of jurisdiction specified in the first two paragraphs of Section
2—the federal question, ambassador, and admiralty jurisdiction in the
first paragraph, and the ambassador and state-as-a-party jurisdiction
Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Akhil Reed
Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1651 (1990).
11. Amar, Original Jurisdiction, supra note 10, at 480–83.
12. Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 10, at 206.
13. Id. at 234.
14. For thoughtful criticisms of Professor Amar’s argument, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The
History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text,
Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L .REV. 1633 (1990).
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in the second paragraph. I say four rather than five heads of
jurisdiction because I am counting ambassador jurisdiction only once.
As to these four heads of jurisdiction, the word “all” authorizes, but
does not require, Congress to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the
federal courts.
Under my reading of the word “all,” Congress may specify that
some or all cases brought under federal question, ambassador, and
admiralty jurisdiction are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts generally. Similarly, Congress may specify that some or
all of the cases brought under ambassador and state-as-a-party
jurisdiction are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. To the extent that Congress specifies that jurisdiction
is exclusive, cases under these heads of jurisdiction can be brought
only in the federal courts. As to such cases, the state courts can hear
none of them. The federal courts must hear all of them.
I. THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMING
I begin at the beginning, with the framing of the Constitution.
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention easily agreed that
there should be a national judiciary with a national Supreme Court.
But they had difficulty agreeing on whether there should be inferior
federal courts. On June 5, 1787, James Madison of Virginia and James
Wilson of Pennsylvania suggested a compromise, now commonly
known as the Madisonian compromise, under which the Constitution
would authorize inferior federal courts, but Congress would decide
15
whether actually to create them. On the same day the compromise
was suggested, Wilson argued to the Convention that “admiralty
jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national Government,
[because] it relate[s] to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular
states, & to a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be
16
most likely to happen.” In Wilson’s view, inferior federal courts
ought to be created because if admiralty jurisdiction were given
“wholly” to the federal courts—meaning, almost certainly, given
exclusively to the federal courts—and if inferior federal courts were
not created, all admiralty cases would have to be brought in the

15. 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 125
(1911).
16. Id. at 124.
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national Supreme Court, far from the ports where the cases were
likely to arise.
There was little recorded discussion of the scope of the federal
courts’ jurisdiction during the course of the Convention. On July 18,
the Convention unanimously resolved either “[t]hat the jurisdiction of
the national Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed
by the general Legislature, and to such other questions as involve the
17
National peace and harmony,” or “that the jurisdiction shall extend
to all cases arising under the Natl. laws: And to such other questions
18
as may involve the Natl. peace & harmony.” The first version
appears in the Journal of the Convention; the second version, which
includes the word “all,” appears in Madison’s notes.
Edmund Randolph of Virginia and John Rutledge of South
Carolina were members of the five-man Committee of Detail,
charged with giving near-final form to the Constitution. Among the
papers of George Mason of Virginia is an undated draft in
Randolph’s handwriting, with emendations in Rutledge’s
handwriting. In this draft, the federal courts’ jurisdiction was spelled
19
out at follows:
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend
I to all cases, arising under laws passed by the general
〈Legislature〉
2. to impeachments of officers, and
3. to such other cases, as the national legislature may assign, as
involving the national peace and harmony,
in the collection of the revenue
in disputes between citizens of different states
〈in disputes between a State & a Citizen or Citizens of another
State〉
in disputes between different states; and
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries
are concerned
〈& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn〉
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except in
〈Cases of Impeachmt. & (in)〉 those instances, in which . . . . the
20
legislature shall organize it[.]

17. 2 id. at 39.
18. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
19. Angle brackets indicate emendations in Rutledge’s handwriting. Parentheses indicate
material crossed out. Id. at 137 n.6.
20. Id. at 146–47 (footnote omitted) (noting that the words “in disputes between a State &
a Citizen or Citizens of another State” were a “[m]arginal note”).
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Note that in this draft the word “all” is a lead-in only to “cases,
arising under laws passed by the general Legislature.”
Wilson was also a member of the Committee of Detail. Among
his papers was an undated draft in his handwriting, also with
21
emendations in Rutledge’s handwriting. This draft spelled out the
federal courts’ jurisdiction somewhat differently. Here, apparently for
the first time, the word “all” is used as the lead-in specifically to
federal question, ambassador, and admiralty jurisdiction. The draft
provided, in language similar to what was to become the first and
second paragraphs of Article III, Section 2:
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme (National) Court shall extend to all
Cases arising under Laws passed by the Legislature of the United
States; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors (and other) 〈other〉 public
Ministers 〈& Consuls〉, to the Trial of Impeachments of Officers of
the United States; to all Cases of Admiralty and Maritime
Jurisdiction; to Controversies between 〈States, — except those wh.
regard Jurisdn or Territory, — betwn〉 a State and a Citizen or
Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States and
between 〈a State or the〉 Citizens (of any of the States) 〈thereof〉 and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In Cases of Impeachment,
(those) 〈Cases〉 affecting Ambassadors (and) other public Ministers
〈& Consuls〉, and those in which a State shall be (one of the) 〈a〉
Part(ies) 〈y〉, this Jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other Cases
beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such Exceptions and
22
under such Regulations as the Legislature shall make.

The significant differences between this and the final version of
Article III, Section 2 were that the entire paragraph described only
the “Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,” that the Supreme Court was
given original jurisdiction over “Cases of Impeachment,” that the
jurisdiction over controversies between states did not include matters
of jurisdiction and territory, and that the word “all” did not precede
the heads of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
On August 6, the Committee of Detail provided its draft to the
Convention. Article XI, Section 3 (as it was then numbered) of the
draft provided for federal court jurisdiction in essentially the words of

21. Id. at 163 n.17 (noting that the words in parentheses were crossed out in the original
draft, that the words in italics are additions by Wilson, and that emendations by Rutledge are in
single brackets 〈 〉).
22. Id. at 172–73.
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23

the Wilson draft I have quoted. On August 27, the Convention
debated what was to become Article III and approved amendments
24
that brought it closer to what would be the final version. On
September 12, the Committee of Style reported the amended judicial
25
article to the full Convention. Leaving aside changes in punctuation
and capitalization, Section 2 was then almost entirely in the form it
was ultimately to take.
Sometime in its drafting process, the Committee of Style had
removed the language preventing federal courts from hearing
controversies between states involving jurisdiction or territory. Then
sometime between September 12, when the Committee reported its
draft to the Convention, and September 17, when the Convention
approved the entire Constitution, a final change was made, adding the
word “all” at the beginning of the clause authorizing the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction over ambassador and state-as-a-party
26
cases. These two changes were made without recorded explanation.
The record of the Constitutional Convention’s deliberations over
the judicial article is frustratingly cryptic. This is due in part to the
fact that the delegates to the Convention were much more concerned
about what became Articles I and II and in part to the fact that
whatever reasons the drafters of Article III might have had for their
choice of words—including the word “all” in Section 2—they kept
those reasons largely to themselves. We have a hint from Wilson,
when he argued for the creation of inferior federal courts based on
the assumption that the federal courts would have exclusive
jurisdiction over admiralty cases. But this is no more than a hint. As
Professor Julius Goebel wrote of Article III in his volume of the
Holmes Devise History, “The judiciary was subjected to much less
critical working over than the other departments of
government. . . . Certainly, when specific provisions were under
27
discussion there was precious little divulged.”

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 186.
Id. at 422–25.
Id. at 590 n.8, 600–01.
Id. at 661.
1 JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 205–06 (1971). Professor Farrand writes similarly,
“To one who is especially interested in the judiciary, there is surprisingly little on the subject to
be found in the records of the convention.” MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 154 (1913).

FLETCHER IN FINAL 2

938

1/5/2010 7:36:21 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:929

II. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
I turn next to the Federalist Papers. They are a hazardous place
to look for an authoritative interpretation of Article III, for they were
written as federalist propaganda to persuade doubters to approve the
proposed Constitution. They nonetheless occupy a special place in an
interpretive endeavor, if for no other reason than the thoughtfulness
and legal sophistication of their authors. In Federalist No. 82,
Alexander Hamilton, who had been a delegate to the Convention,
explored the distinction between the federal courts’ exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction under Article III.
Hamilton first set up a straw man, asking whether the federal
courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over all cases to which the
judicial power extends under Article III, Section 2—which would
include not only federal question, ambassador, and admiralty cases,
but also controversies in which jurisdiction depended on the status of
28
the parties, such as diversity suits. He then asked whether, instead,
federal courts should have concurrent jurisdiction with the state
courts over at least some of the suits that come within the jurisdiction
29
conferred by Article III. Not surprisingly, Hamilton chose the
second alternative.
In Hamilton’s view, the state courts were to have concurrent
jurisdiction over suits of which the states had “previous cognizance”
30
as part of their “primitive” jurisdiction. That is, the states would
continue to have at least concurrent jurisdiction over suits over which
they had jurisdiction before the adoption of the Constitution, for
example, suits based on contract, tort, or other nonfederal law. An
example in Article III is a case in which the jurisdiction is based on
party identity rather than subject matter, such as a controversy
between the citizens of diverse states. In these controversies, the
federal courts would not be constitutionally permitted to have
exclusive jurisdiction.
But in Hamilton’s view, “cases which may grow out of, and be
peculiar to, the Constitution to be established” could be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts if Congress chose to make that
31
jurisdiction exclusive. Such cases had not been part of a state’s

28.
29.
30.
31.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id.
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“primitive” jurisdiction, because such cases could not have existed
before the creation of the national government. According to
Hamilton, the federal courts could have either exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction in such cases, depending on the will of
32
Congress. For example, in a federal question case (a case that
depended on the creation of the new national government for its
existence), jurisdiction would be concurrent if Congress said nothing.
However, if Congress “expressly excluded” the state courts from
exercising concurrent jurisdiction, the federal courts’ jurisdiction
33
would be exclusive.
Nowhere in Federalist No. 82 does Hamilton refer to the word
“all” in discussing Article III. Nor does Hamilton’s distinction
between cases depending on the new national government for their
existence, over which the federal courts could have exclusive
jurisdiction, and “primitive” jurisdiction cases, over which the federal
courts could have no more than concurrent jurisdiction, map perfectly
onto the heads of jurisdiction preceded, or not preceded, by the word
“all.” For example, the state courts had exercised jurisdiction over
34
admiralty cases under the Articles of Confederation. Perhaps, given
his audience, Hamilton preferred to argue at a level of general
principle rather than fine-grained textual analysis. But despite his
failure to mention the word “all” (or indeed to quote any of the text
of Article III), and despite his somewhat imprecise sorting of the two
types of cases, Hamilton’s argument tells us to read the heads of
subject matter jurisdiction in Article III as authorizing either
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction for some suits and only
concurrent jurisdiction for others.
III. THE JUDICIARY ACT
35

The first Judiciary Act, adopted in September 1789 during the
first session of the first Congress, gives us a clear idea of what Article
III was to mean in practice. Because many of the members of the first
Congress had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention only
two years earlier, we may infer that many of the members of Congress
voting for the Judiciary Act believed that the subject matter
jurisdiction conferred by the Act was consistent with the Framers’
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 831 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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understanding of Article III. Only a little of Professor Goebel’s
excellent history of the adoption of the Judiciary Act bears directly
36
on the question before us. But by combining Professor Goebel’s
history, an examination of the drafts of the Act, and an analysis of
what record we have of the debates in Congress, we may obtain a
fairly good idea of what the adopters thought they were doing when
they passed the Act.
The first draft of the Act was prepared by members of the Senate
and presented to that body. After some modifications by the Senate,
the bill was sent to the House. The House, in turn, made some
modifications before sending the bill to the President for signature,
though none of those amendments affected the federal courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction. Ten senators, one from each of the states that had
thus far ratified the Constitution, comprised the committee that
37
prepared the first draft for the Senate. Three of those men were
preeminent by education and experience, and it was they who were
38
“mainly responsible for the form and content” of the draft. They
were Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, previously a judge on the state
trial court and later Chief Justice of the United States; William
Paterson of New Jersey, previously the state’s attorney general and
later a Justice of the United States Supreme Court; and Caleb Strong
of Massachusetts, previously a judge on the state trial court and later
governor of Massachusetts. All three men had been delegates to the
39
Constitutional Convention. Indeed, Paterson had been a sponsor of
the New Jersey Plan, proposed early in the Convention. None of the
three had been on the Committee of Detail that drafted Article III,
however, and none had been present on August 27, 1787, for the
40
Convention’s principal debate on Article III. The portion of the
final version of the Act dealing with the federal courts’ subject matter
jurisdiction was remarkably similar to the draft their committee
41
presented to the Senate.
Unfortunately, there is no record in the Annals of Congress of
the debate in the Senate and only an incomplete record of the debate
36. GOEBEL, supra note 27, at 457–508.
37. 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, at 22 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992).
38. GOEBEL, supra note 27, at 459.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 459 n.8.
41. 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, supra note 37, at 38–108 (containing a section-by-section comparison).
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in the House. Professor Maeva Marcus’s excellent documentary
history of the Supreme Court fills in some of the gaps by relying on
42
letters written by senators and members of the House, but even with
that assistance we are left with an incomplete picture. The recorded
portion of the debate in the House took place on August 24, 29, and
43
31. All three days were devoted to a motion by Samuel Livermore of
New Hampshire to strike the section of the Senate bill that
44
established the district courts. The motion was understood by
everyone to decide whether federal trial courts should be created or
whether, instead, the state courts should be given all the trial court
business of the new national government. Had the motion passed,
Livermore almost certainly would have introduced a motion to strike
the section creating the circuit courts. On August 31, Livermore’s
45
motion was defeated by a vote of thirty-one to eleven.
The substance of the House debates was not new. Professor
Goebel describes the debates as consisting “chiefly of warmed-over
46
arguments from the days of the ratification struggle.” Livermore and
his allies contended that the jurisdiction given to the district courts,
the most important of which was admiralty, could be equally well
exercised by state courts. The central argument of those opposing
Livermore’s motion was that admiralty and federal criminal
jurisdiction should be exclusively given to the federal courts. At
times, their argument appeared to be that Article III required this
jurisdiction to be exclusive. At other times, the argument appeared to
be that Article III permitted, but did not require, this jurisdiction to
47
be exclusive.
The primary spokesperson for the federalists was William Smith
of South Carolina. A native South Carolinian, Smith had received his
education in England and Switzerland, but had returned to South
48
Carolina in 1783 to practice law. He had not been a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention. Smith’s primary concern was to convince
his listeners that federal district courts should be created to hear
admiralty cases, but he argued broadly that Congress was obliged to
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 22–38.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783–84, 796–820, 820–34 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
See id.
Id. at 834.
GOEBEL, supra note 27, at 504.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796–804 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
GEORGE C. ROGERS, EVOLUTION OF A FEDERALIST: WILLIAM LOUGHTON SMITH OF
CHARLESTON 1758-1812, at 98 (1962).
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vest the judicial power authorized by Article III exclusively in the
federal courts:
There is another important consideration; that is, how far the
Constitution stands in the way of this motion. It is declared by that
instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one supreme, and in such inferior courts as Congress shall
from time to time establish. Here is no discretion, then, in Congress
to vest the judicial power of the United States in any other [tribunal]
than the Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the United States.
It is further declared that the judicial power of the United States
shall extend to all cases of a particular description. How is that
power to be administered? Undoubtedly by the tribunals of the
United States; if the judlcial [sic] power of the United States extends
to those specified cases, it follows indisputably that the tribunals of
the United States must likewise extend to them. What is the object
of the motion? To assign the jurisdiction of some of these very cases
49
to the State courts . . . .

At the beginning of his argument, Smith appears to contend that
all of the jurisdiction authorized by Article III must be vested
exclusively in the federal courts. By his later reference to “all cases of
a particular description,” Smith may have intended to narrow the
argument to the three heads of jurisdiction preceded by the word
“all.” But his argument is ambiguous because each head of
jurisdiction in Section 2 of Article III, not limited to these three, has a
“particular description.”
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts also opposed Livingston’s motion.
Ames, like Smith, had not been a delegate to the Convention. He
focused on jurisdiction over federal criminal cases in the district
court. The Annals reported:
His wish was to establish this conclusion, that offences against
statutes of the United States, and actions, the cognizance whereof is
created de novo, are exclusively of Federal jurisdiction . . . . These,
with the admiralty jurisdiction, which it is agreed must be provided
50
for, constitute the principal powers of the district courts.

Madison also opposed the motion, but he took a more nuanced
view than either Smith or Ames. Madison, of course, had been a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention. Indeed, as I recounted

49. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 801 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
50. Id. at 808.
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earlier, he and Wilson were the authors of the famous Madisonian
compromise that produced Article III. Madison was quite willing to
contemplate the possibility, consistent with Article III, that the
federal and state courts could have concurrent jurisdiction over cases
arising under federal law:
Madison said, it would not be doubted that some Judiciary system
was necessary to accomplish the objects of the Government, and
that it ought to be commensurate with the other branches of the
Government. . . . [I]n the new Constitution a regular system is
provided; the Legislative power is made effective for its objects; the
Executive is co-extensive with the Legislative, and it is equally
proper that this should be the case with the Judiciary. If the latter be
concurrent with the State jurisdictions, it does not follow that it will
51
for that reason be impracticable.

But the practical problems associated with a concurrent judicial
jurisdiction were, in Madison’s view, greater than those associated
with concurrent legislative jurisdiction: “[I]t may be safely affirmed
that there is more, both of novelty and difficulty in that arrangement,
than there will be in the other. To make the State courts Federal
52
courts, is liable to insuperable objections . . . .”
Madison pointed out that “[i]t may be remarked” that “mak[ing]
the State courts Federal courts” would take the power of nominating
53
federal judges away from the federal executive. Further, Madison
pointed out, some state courts could not be trusted:
[A] review of the constitution of the courts in many States will
satisfy us that they cannot be trusted with the execution of the
Federal laws. In some of the States, it is true, they might, and would
be safe and proper organs of such a jurisdiction ; but in others they
are so dependent on State Legislatures, that to make the Federal
laws dependent on them, would throw us back into all the
54
embarrassments which characterized our former situation.

As drafted by the Senate committee, and as ultimately adopted by the
first Congress, the Act was closer to Madison’s view than to that
expressed by Smith and Ames.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 812.
Id.
Id. at 812–13.
Id. at 813.
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The Judiciary Act was extremely precise in its division between
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction. As will be seen, that division
corresponds exactly to the use, and nonuse, of the word “all” in
Article III, Section 2. First, in Section 9 of the Act, Congress
55
conferred jurisdiction on the district courts. The jurisdiction
conferred was very similar to that conferred by the first draft of the
56
bill proposed to the Senate. Those courts were given exclusive
jurisdiction over “crimes and offences . . . cognizable under the
57
authority of the United States.” Such jurisdiction was almost
certainly seen as coming under federal question jurisdiction because
any criminal prosecution for a crime against the United States was
58
almost certainly seen as a crime in violation of federal law. The
district courts were also given exclusive jurisdiction over suits against
59
consuls or vice-consuls. This jurisdiction obviously came under
ambassador jurisdiction. Finally, the district courts were given
exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty cases, subject only to the famous
60
“saving to suitors” clause. In other words, the district courts were
given exclusive jurisdiction over some of the cases that fell under each
of the three heads of jurisdiction preceded by the word “all” in the
first paragraph of Article III, Section 2—federal question,
ambassador, and admiralty.
Also in Section 9 of the Act, the district courts were given
concurrent jurisdiction over suits “for a tort only in violation of the
61
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” This was the original
62
version of the Alien Tort Statute, recently addressed by the United
63
States Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. We may note
two things about this jurisdiction. First, jurisdiction over suits brought
for the violation of the law of nations was concurrent. The law of
nations was what we today call customary international law. In 1789,
no part of customary international law was federal law. A suit
55. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77.
56. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 37, at 53–57.
57. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76.
58. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33–34 (1812). See generally Du
Ponceau, supra note 5 (arguing that federal courts do not have any common law jurisdiction that
increases their jurisdiction beyond that given by the Constitution or Congress).
59. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
63. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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brought under the law of nations thus came within the state courts’
primitive jurisdiction that existed before the adoption of the
Constitution, and the only basis for subject matter jurisdiction in
federal courts was party-based diversity jurisdiction. Therefore,
federal court jurisdiction over such cases could be no more than
concurrent. Second, jurisdiction over suits brought for violation of a
United States treaty was also concurrent. A treaty is federal law
within the meaning of federal question jurisdiction. Congress
therefore could have made federal jurisdiction exclusive. But, as
Hamilton had argued in Federalist No. 82, Congress could also
choose—as it did here—to make the jurisdiction concurrent.
Second, in Section 11 of the Act, Congress conferred jurisdiction
64
on the circuit courts. Just as in Section 9, the jurisdiction conferred is
very similar to that conferred by the first draft of the bill proposed to
65
the Senate. We should not think of the circuit courts as comparable
to the federal circuit courts of today. There were no circuit judges, in
the modern sense of the term. Rather, the circuit courts were staffed
66
by district judges and by Supreme Court Justices riding circuit. The
circuit courts heard appeals from the district courts. In the exercise of
that appellate jurisdiction, they had the same exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction as the district courts under Section 9 of the
Act. But the circuit courts were primarily courts of original
jurisdiction. Congress gave them original exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal offenses against the United States, just as it gave such
jurisdiction to the district courts. And Congress gave them original
concurrent jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of
different states when the amount in controversy was over five
67
hundred dollars. Because such suits were based on diversity of
citizenship—a head of jurisdiction not preceded by the word “all”—
Congress could not have given more than concurrent jurisdiction.
Third, in Section 13 of the Act, Congress specified the
68
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Just as in Sections 9 and 11, the
jurisdiction specified by Section 13 is very similar to that specified by

64. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79.
65. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 37, at 58–63.
66. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75.
67. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79.
68. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81.
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the first draft of the bill proposed in the Senate. Section 13
authorized exclusive original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over
suits against ambassadors and other public ministers, and original, but
not exclusive, jurisdiction over suits brought by ambassadors or other
70
public ministers. In other words, Congress granted to the Supreme
Court exclusive original jurisdiction over a subcategory of
ambassador jurisdiction cases, and allowed the state courts to have
concurrent jurisdiction over another subcategory. When the
ambassador or public minister was a defendant—and when United
States foreign relations might be seriously and adversely affected by
the suit—the Supreme Court alone was entrusted to decide the suit.
When, on the other hand, the ambassador or public minister was a
plaintiff, he was permitted to choose the court—state or federal—he
thought most convenient or most likely to be sympathetic to his
cause.
Also in Section 13, Congress authorized exclusive original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over suits between states, and
concurrent original jurisdiction over suits between a state and its
71
citizens and between a state and citizens of other states or aliens.
This is the only section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in which a federal
court was granted exclusive jurisdiction when the head of subject
matter jurisdiction was not federal question, ambassador, or
admiralty, as provided in the first paragraph of Article III, Section 2.
But the basis for exclusive original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court
was not the first paragraph of Section 2. Rather, it was the second
paragraph, which provided for original jurisdiction over “all”
ambassador and state-as-a-party cases.
In sum, the subject matter jurisdiction implemented in Sections
9, 11, and 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 corresponds perfectly with
the heads of jurisdiction preceded, and not preceded, by the word
“all.” Under each of the three heads of jurisdiction preceded by the
word “all” in the first paragraph of Article III, Section 2—federal
question, ambassador, and admiralty—the Judiciary Act authorized
some exclusive jurisdiction in the newly created lower courts. Under
the two heads of jurisdiction preceded by the word “all” in the second

69. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 37, at 69–71.
70. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80. For a particularly useful historical analysis of Section 13, see
generally Pfander, supra note 2.
71. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
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paragraph of Section 2—ambassador and state-as-a-party
jurisdiction—the Act authorized some original exclusive jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court. By contrast, under the heads of jurisdiction not
preceded by the word “all,” Congress authorized only concurrent
jurisdiction in the newly created lower courts and in the Supreme
Court.
In 1801, the lame-duck federalists of the Adams administration
passed a short-lived statute that created circuit courts staffed by
genuine circuit judges and authorized original general federal
72
question jurisdiction in those courts. The jurisdiction authorized by
73
the Judiciary Act of 1801 is consistent with my reading of the word
“all,” and consistent with the jurisdiction conferred by the 1789 Act.
Section 10 of the Act conferred on the newly created circuit courts
74
jurisdiction previously exercised by the circuit courts. In addition,
Section 11 conferred on the new circuit courts concurrent original
jurisdiction over federal question cases and over common law cases to
75
which the United States was a party. Finally, Section 11 conferred
on the circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction over “all penalties and
forfeitures, made, arising or accruing under the laws of the United
76
States.”
During the House debates leading up to the passage of the 1801
Act, Abraham Nott of South Carolina, who had not been a delegate
to the Convention, explained his understanding of Article III,
Section 2. In Nott’s view, the word “all” in the first paragraph of
Section 2 required exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over
federal question, ambassador, and admiralty jurisdiction. As recorded
in the Annals:
[Nott] said there was a marked difference between the words of the
Constitution relating to the catalogue of cases enumerated in the
first part of [Section 2], and those in the latter part of the same. The
word “all” was prefixed to each of the cases first mentioned, down
to the words “admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” inclusive, but
was omitted in all the subsequent cases. He could see no reason why
that word was added in the former part of the section, and omitted
in the latter, except it meant that there was no case of the former

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, §§ 7, 11, 2 Stat. 89, 90, 92 (repealed 1802).
Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802).
§ 10, 2 Stat. at 92.
§ 11, 2 Stat. at 92.
Id.
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description to which the Judicial power of the United States should
not extend; in fact that the courts of the United States should have
exclusive jurisdiction of all those cases, and in the latter their
77
jurisdiction should be concurrent with the State courts.

However, Nott’s definition of the constitutionally required
exclusive federal question jurisdiction was much narrower than the
constitutionally available federal question jurisdiction outlined by the
78
Supreme Court in Osborn v. Bank of the United States in 1824, a
little more than twenty years later. (Indeed, it closely resembles
Justice Holmes’s “arising under” test for statutory federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, articulated in American Well
79
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. ) According to Nott,
the distinction was between cases arising under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and those that did not. . . . If a person
should give a note of hand for a hundred dollars on unstamped
paper, with a view of evading [the federal stamp act], he was liable
to a penalty ; that would of course be a case arising under a law of
the United States . . . . But an action brought on a note of hand
written on stamped paper, is not a case arising under the law of the
80
United States, but arises from the contract itself . . . .

IV. JUSTICE STORY’S VIEW
Finally, I turn to Justice Story’s opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee, written in 1816. There is some reason to be suspicious of
Story’s interpretation of Article III. Story was not a member of the
Framers’ generation, and he made no claim to know firsthand what
the Framers had intended. Moreover, he was an ardent advocate of
the expansion of federal judicial power, and his jurisdictional
interpretations and arguments in his speeches, treatises, and opinions
were all in the service of such expansion. I will give only two
examples: Story campaigned for the elimination of the last sentence
of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which restricted the
Supreme Court’s review of state court judgments to the federal

77.
78.
79.
80.

10 ANNALS OF CONG. 894 (1851).
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 895 (1851).
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question providing the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. While
riding circuit, Story wrote an opinion extending federal admiralty
82
jurisdiction to cover marine insurance contracts. Indeed, Story’s
enthusiasm for admiralty jurisdiction was so great that his
contemporaries joked that he would assert admiralty jurisdiction over
83
a corn cob floating in a bucket of water. Nonetheless, we should
take Story’s views seriously, for his was one of the preeminent legal
minds of his generation.
In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Story argued that Congress
was constitutionally required to confer on the federal courts the full
extent of the jurisdiction authorized in Article III, Section 2. He
wrote, “[T]he whole judicial power of the United States should be, at
all times, vested either in an original or appellate form, in some courts
84
created under its authority.” “It being, then, established that the
language of this clause is imperative, the next question is as to the
cases to which it shall apply. The answer is found in the constitution
itself. The judicial power shall extend to all the cases enumerated in
85
the constitution.”
In Story’s view, Congress’s constitutional
obligation to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts
thus extended not only to the three heads of jurisdiction that were
introduced by the word “all” but also to the later heads of jurisdiction
that were not preceded by “all.” I do not argue for this expansive
interpretation of Congress’s constitutional obligation to confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts, but I note that this view has some
86
support among modern scholars.
Justice Story attached significance to the word “all” that
preceded the federal question, ambassador, and admiralty heads of
jurisdiction in the first paragraph. But he did not argue that the word
meant that Congress must confer the full extent of the
constitutionally authorized jurisdiction under only these three heads.
81. See, e.g., Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 325–26 (1818). This sentence was
eliminated after the Civil War, but the Court refused to expand its jurisdiction to questions of
general law present in the case. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 617,
635–36 (1875).
82. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
83. See, e.g., Note, Extension of Federal Jurisdiction over State Canals, 37 AM. L. REV. 911,
916 (1903).
84. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816).
85. Id. at 333.
86. See, e.g., 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 9, at 613–16; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View
of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984).
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Rather, he argued that Congress was required to confer the full
extent of jurisdiction under every head of jurisdiction in Article III,
not limited to those three.
Although most of Justice Story’s voluminous writings are
extremely clear, parts of his opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee are
uncharacteristically opaque. But his reading of the word “all,” and his
reasons for that reading, are reasonably clear. In Story’s view, the
function of the word “all” was to confer exclusive, or potentially
exclusive, jurisdiction on the federal courts for the three heads of
jurisdiction introduced by that word. Based on this reading of “all,”
Story argued that Congress was obliged to create some inferior
federal courts. I will explain his reasoning in three steps.
First, Justice Story asked what part of the judicial power granted
in Article III, Section 2 is exclusive, either by direction of the
Constitution or at the pleasure of Congress. His answer was the three
heads of jurisdiction preceded by the word “all.” He wrote:
In what cases (if any) is this judicial power exclusive, or exclusive
at the election of congress? It will be observed that there are two
classes of cases enumerated in the constitution, between which a
distinction seems to be drawn. The first class includes cases arising
under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States ; cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In this class the expression is,
and that the judicial power shall extend to all cases ; but in the
subsequent part of the clause which embraces all the other cases of
national cognizance, and forms the second class, the word “all” is
dropped seemingly ex industria. Here the judicial authority is to
extend to controversies (not to all controversies) to which the
United States shall be a party, &c. From this difference of
phraseology, perhaps, a difference of constitutional intention may,
with propriety, be inferred. It is hardly to be presumed that the
variation in the language could have been accidental. It must have
been the result of some determinate reason ; and it is not very
difficult to find a reason sufficient to support the apparent change of
intention. In respect to the first class, it may well have been the
intention of the framers of the constitution imperatively to extend
the judicial power either in an original or appellate form to all cases ;
and in the latter class to leave it to congress to qualify the
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jurisdiction, original or appellate, in such manner as public policy
87
might dictate.

Second, Justice Story argued that, as to those cases over which
the federal courts have constitutionally required exclusive
jurisdiction, and over which the Supreme Court cannot have original
jurisdiction, Congress is obliged to create inferior federal courts:
It would seem, therefore, to follow, that congress are bound to
create some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction
which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United
States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original
cognizance. They might establish one or more inferior courts ; they
might parcel out the jurisdiction among such courts, from time to
88
time, at their own pleasure.

Third, Justice Story explicitly differentiated between the two
categories of heads of jurisdiction in Section 2. As to controversies,
which were not preceded by the word “all,” federal court jurisdiction
may be concurrent with that of the state courts. As to cases, which
were preceded by the word “all,” exclusive federal court jurisdiction
“might well” be justified. He wrote:
The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do
not inquire) that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies,
and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be
supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of
justice. Hence, in controversies between states ; between citizens of
different states ; between citizens claiming grants under different
states ; between a state and its citizens, or foreigners, and between
citizens and foreigners, it enables the parties, under the authority of
congress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and determined
before the national tribunals. No other reason than that which has
been stated can be assigned, why some, at least, of those cases
should not have been left to the cognizance of the state courts. In
respect to the other enumerated cases—the cases arising under the
constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, cases affecting
ambassadors and other public ministers, and cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction—reasons of a higher and more extensive

87. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 333–34.
88. Id. at 331.
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nature, touching the safety, peace, and sovereignty of the nation,
89
might well justify a grant of exclusive jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
History is not science, which we think, or at least hope, can
provide a single right answer if we work hard enough. Rather, history
(including legal history) is necessarily indeterminate. I do not claim to
have found the single right answer to the meaning of “all” in Article
III. But I do think that I have found the answer that makes the most
sense of the available historical materials.
In my view, the word “all,” when it precedes federal question,
ambassador, and admiralty jurisdiction in the first paragraph of
Section 2, authorizes but does not require Congress to confer
exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts generally. The same word,
when it precedes ambassador and state-as-a-party jurisdiction in the
second paragraph of Section 2, authorizes but does not require
Congress to confer exclusive original jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court. By negative inference, the absence of the word “all” preceding
the other heads of jurisdiction in Section 2 prevents Congress from
conferring on the federal courts anything more than concurrent
jurisdiction with the state courts. This view is perfectly consistent with
the words of Article III itself, with the Judiciary Act of 1789, passed
two years after the approval of Article III by the Constitutional
Convention, and with the ill-fated Judiciary Act of 1801. It is
somewhat, but not perfectly, consistent with the views expressed by
Hamilton in Federalist No. 82, by members of Congress in the
debates leading to the enactment of the 1789 and 1801 Acts, and by
Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.
This reading of the word “all” is also perfectly consistent with the
modern jurisdictional structure of the federal courts. As in the
original Act, there is now statutorily conferred exclusive federal
90
91
92
question, ambassador, and admiralty jurisdiction in the federal
trial courts. As in the original Act, there is now exclusive original

89. Id. at 347.
90. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006) (securities); id. § 717u (natural gas); 18 U.S.C. § 3231
(2006) (crimes against the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006) (bankruptcy); id. § 1338(a)
(copyright, patent, and plant variety); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (2006) (ERISA).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1351.
92. Id. § 1333.
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jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in state-state diversity cases, and
concurrent original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in some
94
ambassador cases, in controversies between the United States and a
state, and in controversies brought by a state against an out-of-state
95
or foreign citizen. As in the original Act, there is concurrent
jurisdiction under some of the heads of jurisdiction preceded the
96
word “all.” Finally, as in the original Act, there is only concurrent
jurisdiction over the heads of jurisdiction in Article III that are not
97
preceded by the word “all.”
What is the modern significance of this reading of the word
“all”? One may prefer Professor Amar’s reading of the word because
of its relevance to the jurisdiction-stripping debates that arise when
Congress (or, more recently, the President) is extremely unhappy
with decisions by the federal courts. Under Professor Amar’s reading,
Congress cannot strip the federal courts of any of their
constitutionally authorized federal question, ambassador, or
admiralty jurisdiction. Under his reading, Congress is required by the
word “all” to authorize subject matter jurisdiction in some federal
court—either originally or on appeal—to the full extent of the
constitutionally available jurisdiction under these three heads. Under
my reading, an argument against jurisdiction stripping by Congress
98
cannot rely on the word “all,” although it can rely on other grounds.

93. Id. § 1251(a).
94. Id. § 1251(b)(1).
95. Id. § 1251(b)(2)–(3).
96. See, e.g., id. § 1331 (general federal question).
97. See, e.g., id. § 1332 (diversity).
98. There is an enormous academic literature on jurisdiction stripping. Excellent recent
articles include Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1002 (2007); Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away:
Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007); John Harrison, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 203 (1997); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2007); James E.
Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1433 (2000). Excellent earlier articles include Paul M. Bator, Withdrawing
Jurisdiction from Federal Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31 (1984); Gerald Gunther,
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over
the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); Martin H.
Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal
Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975); Lawrence Gene
Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’
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This result may be regarded as an unfortunate consequence of my
reading of the word. But I am not so sure.
One of the abiding difficulties in our democracy is reconciling
the exercise of judicial power, especially the power to declare Acts of
Congress unconstitutional, with our sense that we should be governed
by our collective democratic will. The late Professor Charles Black
recognized that the power of Congress over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts may help achieve that reconciliation. Professor Black
loved to tell the story—perhaps true, perhaps not—of a renowned
French priest sailing into New York, in the days when people came to
the United States by sea. As his ship came into the harbor, the priest
said to waiting reporters, “It is wonderful to breathe the sweet air of
99
legitimacy!”
The legitimacy of our government is produced by the mutually
reinforcing actions of the political and judicial branches. If the federal
judiciary has the power of judicial review, and if it chooses to leave
acts of Congress undisturbed, the judiciary has to that degree
accepted and legitimized the exercise of Congress’s power. And if
Congress has the power to strip the federal courts of their jurisdiction,
and if it chooses to leave their jurisdiction undiminished, Congress
has to that degree in turn accepted and legitimized the exercise of
judicial power.
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